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• Officer Safety justified holding occupant of house in handcuffs during execution of search warrant; Questioning of Occupant was not a violation of Fourth Amendment
• Police Employers Liable for disparate impact age discrimination

Federal and State Decisions

• Search Warrant for Home was proper where drug seller travelled from home to buy site several times
• Pretext Arrests for purpose of search incident to arrest approved
• Using Inventory Search for investigatory purposes was improper
• Plain Feel Doctrine applied to wads of money felt in drug sale defendant's pockets during Terry frisk
• Attempt to Avoid Roadblock was reasonable suspicion for stop
• Consent to Search Car During Traffic Stop was not valid where motorist was not free to leave
• Interrogation Issues: taping a bribe offer; interrogation at home was not custodial; telling suspect why he had been arrested was not "interrogation"; defendant's statement he did not want to "snitch" on his accomplices was not exercise of right to silence; eighteen hours of interrogation did not void waiver of rights; "If you didn't pull the trigger, you won't be in any trouble" was an improper promise of leniency.
• Statute on Solicitation for Prostitution in a Public Place did not apply to inside of car travelling on a public street
• Evidence Issues: digital enhancement of surveillance tape; use of interrogation videotape at trial; admissibility of computer-assisted accident reconstruction calculations in multiple occupant cases
• Police Witness Issues: identity of drugs; reading from a domestic violence checklist; demonstrating for jury how search was made
• Civil Liability/Personnel Law Issues: defamation; police dogs; police pursuit; deadly force; excessive force: tackling an arrestee; failure to protect prisoner, student; officer's use of drugs; internal affairs investigations; "good cause" for discharge; liability for psychological testing; police liability for gender discrimination and sexual harassment by superior

Contents

United States Supreme Court

http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1423.ZS.html

Plaintiff Mena and others were detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises they occupied. The defendants were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers under the civil rights act and the trial court found in her favor. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af firmed, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. 332 F.3d 1255.

The United States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision. The Court ruled that Mena's detention in handcuffs for the length of the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The detention was considered consistent with the case of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), in which the Court held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority "to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. "The Court there noted that minimizing the risk of harm to officers is a substantial justification for detaining an occupant during a search, and ruled that an officer's authority to detain incident to a search is categorical and does not depend on the "quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure." Because a warrant existed to search the premises and Mena was an occupant of the premises at the time of the search, her detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under the Summers case. The use of force in the form of handcuffs to detain Mena was considered reasonable because the governmental interest in minimizing the risk of harm to both the officers and occupants, at its maximum when a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises, outweighed the marginal intrusion. Although the duration of a detention can affect the balance of interests, the 2- to 3-hour detention in handcuffs in this case did not outweigh the government's continuing safety interests.

On the issue of the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status during her detention, this also did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights. The Court noted it had "held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure." Because Mena's initial detention was lawful and the appellate court did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Mena's immigration status was required.

The majority opinion was delivered by the Chief Justice, with concurrences by four Justices in the result.

http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1160.ZS.html

In revising its employee pay plan, the defendant city granted raises to all police officers and police dispatchers in an attempt to bring their starting salaries up to the regional average. Officers with less than five years' service received proportion ately greater raises than those with more seniority, and most officers over 40 had more than five years of service. The plaintiffs, a group of older officers, filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employ ment Act of 1967 (ADEA), claiming that they were adversely affected by the plan because of their age. The trial court granted the city summary judgment. Affirming, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that disparate-impact claims are categorically unavailable under the ADEA, but it assumed that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs would entitle them to relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 351 F.3d 183.

In a 5-3 decision and a lead opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the ADEA does authorize recovery in disparate-impact cases similar to discrimination cases brought under Title VII. Except for the substitution of "age" for "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," the language of the ADEA and Title VII is identical. Unlike Title VII, however, the ADEA significantly narrows its coverage by permitting any "otherwise prohibited" action by employers "where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age."

The Court went on to find that the city's ratio nale for the differential raises was "unquestionably reasonable." The city had said it needed to raise salaries in the junior ranks in order to become more competitive with other police departments in the region in recruiting and retaining officers. "While there may have been other reasonable ways for the city to achieve its goals, the one selected was not unreasonable," Justice Stevens said.

While the plaintiffs did not win their case, the result of the decision was to remove a significant ambiguity from the ADEA. Now it is clear that employers are liable for disparate impact discrimination as well as intentional discrimination under the statute. Law enforcement employers will need to examine their policies that have different impacts on workers of different ages and make sure that they can justify the policies on a basis other than age.

Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas dissented.

Arrest, Search and Seizure

Interrogation

Civil Liability/Personnel Law

Copyright (c) 2005 by Law Enforcement Legal Publications