• Reference to “Another Waco” Did Not Spoil Consent to Search

United States Supreme Court Action

• Court Adopts Bright Line Rule of 14 Days on When Police Can Re-Question Defendants After an Initial Invocation of Right to Counsel
• Court Clarifies Language of Miranda Warnings
• Court Clarifies Liability Basis for Excessive Force Claims by Prisoners

Federal and State Decisions

• Arrest, Search and Seizure Issues: search warrants; particularity; incorporation of affidavit; exclusionary rule; search incident to arrest; briefcase; consensual encounters; mistake of law; stop and frisk; 911 call; private search; consent; voluntariness; traffic stop; threat to use dog; subjective intent; girlfriend; implied consent; right to privacy; tracking devices; property left at another person’s home; shared computer files
• Interrogation Issues: Miranda; invocation of right to counsel; equivocal response; waiver; failure to sign form; voluntariness; promises of immunity; non-custodial interview; language problems
• Crimes; Trial Procedure: impersonating law enforcement officer; obtaining “thing of value”; police witness; confrontation violation
• Civil Liability/Personnel Law Issues: false arrest; curtilage of house; garage search; excessive force; tasers; domestic violence; handcuffed suspect; strip searches—jails; fabrication of false identification; good faith defense; attorney’s fees; nominal damage award; sexual assault of arrestees; duty to train; liability of police supervisors for acts of subordinates; chain of command issues; police chief termination; ADA discrimination; DUI conviction; police plaintiff; fireman’s rule; duty tasks

Contents

Special Bulletin: Psychological Threats Did Not Render Consent to Search Involuntary
United States v. Kelley No. 09-1561 (8th Cir. 2010).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/091561p.pdf


Defendant’s girlfriend, who was living with defendant, voluntarily consented to a search of their home for weapons in spite of the fact that the officer asking for consent made vague references to Waco, Texas; that he did not want anyone hurt; and that he did not want anyone else raising her children. To the same effect that the police arrived at the home in four police cars, with four officers outside the home.

“. . . Kelley [defendant-boyfriend] alleges that Sergeant Stanley procured Tanya’s consent to enter the property by making three threatening statements to Tanya: (1) that he did not want anyone to get hurt, (2) that he did not want ‘another Waco,’ and (3) that he did not want anyone else raising her children. At a hearing before the magistrate judge, Tanya testified that these statements scared her and that she was startled when she arrived at her home and saw three police cars in her driveway. However, Tanya also testified that she would have allowed Sergeant Stanley to search her property regardless of the alleged threats. In other words, Tanya admitted that Sergeant Stanley’s alleged threats did not cause her to consent to the search. Having reviewed Tanya’s testimony at the suppression hearing, we find no clear error in the district court’s determination that Sergeant Stanley’s alleged threats did not render Tanya’s consent involuntary. Moreover, we agree with the district court that the mere presence of several police cars and four officers outside Kelley’s home was insufficient to call into question the voluntariness of Tanya’s consent to search. See United States v. Barnum, 564 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the presence of two armed officers is not enough to negate consent without threats or physical intimidation); United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 710 (8th Cir. 2005) (same).”