Year-End Special: Annual Case Digest

Highlights of This Issue

Federal and State Decisions

Traffic Stop: Reasonable Suspicion; Seat Belt Violation

State. When a small child looked back several times from a car at a following police car, this, by itself, did not constitute a reasonable suspicion that the child was not wearing a seat belt, and thus, did not warrant an investigative stop.

"We have reviewed out-of-state cases involving the question of whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to stop for a seatbelt violation, but none of these cases involved as sparse a record as we find in the present case. Several cases have held that reasonable suspicion is established when the officer testifies that he had a clear and unobstructed view of the defendant not wearing a seat belt. A couple of other cases have held that the apparent absence of a shoulder harness constitutes reasonable suspicion to stop even if it is possible that the particular model of car is exempt from shoulder harness requirements or that an unusual configuration of the shoulder harness in a particular car hides it from rear view.

"In the present case, however, all the record shows is that the child 'looked back' several times. We hold that this fact is simply not enough to give rise to reasonable suspicion that the child was not wearing a seat belt. . . ."

State. Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine of police community caretaking function applied in the state, this court ruled that a driver's momentary crossing of the edge line of a roadway and later touching of that line did not rise to the level necessary to justify a traffic stop on the ground that it was a community caretaking stop for purposes of providing assistance to the driver.

"Several states have recognized that, under the community caretaking function discussed in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, l715 (1973), a police officer may stop a vehicle to ensure the safety of the occupant without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. . . .

"Neither this Court nor the General Assembly has adopted the community caretaking function in this context, and the State has not urged us to do so in this case. Assuming arguendo, however, that the community caretaking function is applicable in Maryland, we conclude that the facts present in this record do not rise to the level necessary to justify the stop on the ground that it was a community caretaking stop for the purposes of providing assistance. The record fails to show specific and articulable facts to justify the stop of a motor vehicle pursuant to the so-called police caretaking function."

Interrogation

Miranda: Custody; Stationhouse Interview; Repeatedly Telling Defendant He Was Free to Leave

State. A police officer told defendant that any cooperation he might give was completely voluntary and defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany the officer to the police station. While on the way to the police station, defendant was not placed in handcuffs or other restraints, and upon reaching the station, the officer read defendant his Miranda rights and again told him he was free to leave before questioning him. The court found that a reasonable person would not have believed that he was in custody when told repeatedly that he could leave before any questioning, defendant was not in Miranda "custody" and his Miranda rights had not attached at that time. The court, therefore, declined to consider defendant's argument on appeal that he had not made an adequate waiver of his Miranda rights.

"A reasonable person would not have believed that he was in custody when told repeatedly that he may feel free to leave before any questioning. See State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62, 71 n. 10, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) ('an important factor distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure is whether the police expressly informed the defendant that he was free to leave at the outset of the interview'). On the basis of those circumstances, we conclude that the court properly found that the defendant was not in custody and, accordingly, that his Miranda rights had not yet attached.

". . . the defendant's waiver claim is irrelevant, and we decline to review it."

Trial Procedure

Juror: Removal for Cause; Married to Arresting Officer's Superior

State. A potential juror in a criminal case who was married to the arresting officer's superior was required to be excused for cause. This was especially true where the juror did not unequivocally state, in response to the trial court's questioning, that she would be able to decide the issues fairly, and where the arresting officer testified for the prosecution at the trial.

The court ruled that the trial court's denial of defendant's request that the juror be excused for cause entitled him to a new trial, since defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges at that point.

One judge dissented.

Civil Liability / Personnel Law

Off-Duty Security Work: Liability for False Arrest

State. A deputy sheriff working off-duty as a computer store security guard marked a customer's receipt as he left with purchased merchandise. The customer loudly questioned what the officer was doing, and the officer followed him outside and attempted an investigative stop for suspicion of disturbing the peace. The deputy clearly identified himself as a law enforcement officer, and placed the customer under arrest when he refused an order to stop getting into his car to leave.

The customer sued both the deputy and the computer store for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The court ruled that the deputy was acting as a law enforcement officer, and not as a store security guard when he made the arrest. His duty as a security guard in protecting the store's property was complete once he marked the customer's receipt. Accordingly, the store was not liable for the deputy's actions.

The deputy, as a law enforcement officer, was entitled to official immunity from suit under state law, so long as he acted in good faith in carrying out a discretionary duty within the scope of his authority, which the court found he did in this case.

Federal. A police officer's involvement in a standoff with an armed suspect did not rise to the level of "abnormal working conditions" for the officer. The court held that the officer failed to establish that his psychic injury was other than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions, since a confrontation with an armed suspect could be anticipated in the course of an officer's duties.

The court said that psychic injury cases for recovery under workers' compensation statutes are highly fact-sensitive and for actual work conditions to be considered abnormal, they must be considered in the context of the specific employment.

"To recover workers' compensation benefits for a psychic injury, a claimant must prove by objective evidence that he has suffered a psychic injury and that such injury is other than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. . . ."