Pending United States Supreme Court Cases; Note From the Editor
As we went to press with this issue, there were
dozens of cases on the Court's docket awaiting oral
argument and decisions. These decisions will result
in many changes in criminal law and procedure
(arrest, search and seizure, interrogation, etc.),
civil liability and personnel law. Decisions will be
published in LELR as they come down, as well as
by Special Bulletins directly to subscribers, and
full text will be available on our internet link. Other
cases are on the Court's docket awaiting action.
A few of the pending cases are listed here:
Chavez v. Martinez, No. 01-1444--law enforcement civil liability for Miranda violations.
Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, No. 01-1572--punitive damages against
municipalities.
Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety v. Doe, No.
01-1231--registration of sex offenders ("Megan's
Law" statute).
Jinks v. Richland County, S.C., No. 02-0258--
wrongful death liability for deaths occurring in
local detention facilities.
Lockyer v. Andrade; Ewing v. California, No.
01-1127; 01-0978--constitutionality of "three
strikes" laws.
Plus many other cases dealing with search and
seizure, arbitration, disability law, discrimination
law, mandatory detention, double jeopardy,
qualified and sovereign immunity, labor issues,
gun control, interrogation of suspects, etc.
contents
Arrest, Search and Seizure
Canine Alert: Automobiles; Reasonable Suspicion; Equipment Violation
State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002).
State. It has been held that in order to lawfully
conduct a narcotics-detection dog sniff around the
exterior of a motor vehicle stopped for a routine
equipment violation, a police officer must have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related
criminal activity. The court in this case found no
reasonable suspicion where the officer testified that
defendant, who was driving a vehicle, acted suspiciously, was evasive and nervous, and had glassy
eyes, but the officer indicated no reason to suspect
driver-related activity.
". . . The officers simply noted that Wiegan was
acting suspiciously, but indicated no reason to
suspect drug-related activity. . . ."
Exigent Circumstances: Anonymous 911 Call Concerning Gunfire in a Home; Plain View Seizure of Evidence
United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2002).
Federal. Police officers acted properly when they
conducted a warrantless search of defendant's home
in response to an emergency situation reported by
an anonymous 911 caller. Under the circumstances
known to them at the time, the officers reasonably
believed an emergency situation justify a warrantless
search of defendant's home for victims of gunfire.
The court said that while validly on the property
in response to an emergency situation reported by
the anonymous 911 caller, the officers were authorized to seize a shotgun found in plain view.
"The fact that no victims are found, or that the
information ultimately proves to be false or inaccurate,
does not render the police action any less lawful. . . .
As long as the officers reasonably believe an emergency situation necessitates their warrantless search,
whether through information provided by a 911 call or
otherwise, such actions must be upheld as constitutional. . . ."
contents
Interrogation
Miranda: Interrogation; Police Statement That Defendant Could Be in "Big Trouble"
State v. Kaba, 798 A.2d 383 (R.I. 2002).
State. A defendant's incriminating statements to a
detective were spontaneous and not the product of
interrogation, and thus Miranda warnings were not
required before the statements were made. The facts
indicated that during an arrest for possession and
conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to deliver,
defendant asked the detective whether he was in
trouble. The detective answered that defendant
"could be in big trouble," and defendant then
volunteered that he had "nothing to do with what
was in the package," which was an incriminating
statement.
"Kaba . . . argues that the statements were inadmissible because at the time he made them, Det.
Briden did not read him his Miranda rights. Kaba's
use of Miranda is misplaced because '[t]he Miranda
doctrine is not applicable to spontaneous statements
but is triggered only by the dual presence of custody
and interrogation.' State v. Walker, 667 A.2d 1242,
1248 (R.I.1995). In the instant case, the statements
were made absent police interrogation and voluntarily
by Kaba, after his arrest. The trial justice found that
'not all arrests require the advisement of Miranda,'
that the warning is necessary 'only when the police
intend to interrogate a suspect,' and therefore, no
warning was necessary under the circumstances. . . .
Because Kaba's statements were spontaneous and not
the product of interrogation, we will not disturb the
trial justice's finding."
One justice dissented.
contents
Civil Liability/Personnel Law
Excessive Force: Police Stand-Off; Exigent Circumstances
Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 295 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2002).
Federal. Police officers responded to a call that a
paranoid schizophrenic man had been menacing
with a gun those attending his bedridden wife. The
police attempted to enter the house when he responded strangely to their knock. He shot one of the
officers, and, after a two-day armed standoff, during
which two more officers were shot, killed himself
and his son after an armored vehicle rammed into
the house.
The court said the officers were not liable under
42 U.S.C. 1983. Exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless entry, as "the created-exigency cases
have typically required some showing of deliberate
conduct on the part of the police evincing an effort
intentionally to evade the warrant requirement. . . .
the use of non-deadly force such as tear gas and
psychological tactics, while perhaps ill-considered,
was not excessive. . . ." As to the plaintiff's substantive due process claim, the court said the police
chief "drew the inference that aggressive tactics
might provoke [the man] to respond in a dangerous
manner toward his wife and child[,]" and the police
chief "also knew that further delay and inaction . . .
posed substantial risks."
Affirmative Action: Police Promotions; African-Americans, Females and Hispanics
Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002).
Federal. A city's promotion of black police officers
to the rank of lieutenant or captain over white police
officers with higher test scores, pursuant to an
affirmative action plan, did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The court found evidence that
racial discrimination had depressed the hiring of
black officers in the past. It said that remedying past
discrimination justified the affirmative action plan,
and noted that a mere handful of black officers were
actually promoted "out of rank," and that promotion
of white officers was merely delayed.
The court held to the same effect for affirmative
action for females and Hispanics.
contents